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Minnesota Statutory Warranties on New Homes-An
Examination and Proposal
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of caveat emptorl was for centuries the un-
questioned rule governing all sales.2 Although discarded with
respect to personal property sales,3 this ancient maxim has en-
dured in real property transactions. 4 As a result, purchasers of
new homes have traditionally lacked a remedy against builders,
except to the extent that builders may provide express warran-
ties. In recent decades, however, courts in many states have
extended the concept of implied warranties to new homes, 5 rec-
1. Caveat emptor has been defined as follows: "Let the purchaser be-
ware, that is, let him examine the article he is buying, and act on his own judg-
ment and at his own risk,-a maxim implying a rule. .. that the purchaser
buys at his own risk, except as to express warranties or those implied by law."
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 428 (2d ed. 1934).
2. For an extensive analysis of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Hamil-
ton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
3. For an analysis of this transition, see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
4. See, e.g., P.B.R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Perren, 243 Ga. 280, 253 S.E.2d 765,
767 (1979); Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa 118, 126, 106 N.W.2d 59, 64 (1960).
5. Currently, thirty-five states have some form of judicially implied war-
ranty. See Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 441, 252 So. 2d 313, 315 (1971);
Nordin Constr. Co. v. City of Nome, 489 P.2d 455, 469-70 n.24 (Alaska 1971);
Kubby v. Crescent Steel, 105 Ariz. 459, 460, 466 P.2d 753, 754 (1970); Wawak v.
Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1094, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles
Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115 CaL Rptr. 648, 651 (1974); Car-
penter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83-84, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964); Graveline v.
Posin, 31 Conn. Supp. 316, 320, 329 A.2d 368, 371 (1974); Smith v. Berwin Build-
ers, Inc., 287 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Putnam v. Roudebush, 352 So.
2d 908, 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415
P.2d 698, 711 (1966); Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Corp., 48 IlL App. 3d 103, 106,
365 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1977); Theis v. Heuer, 149 Ind. App. 52, 63, 270 N.E.2d 764, 769
(1971), afd, 264 Ind. 1, 12, 280 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1972); McFeeters v. Renollet, 210
Kan. 158, 165, 500 P.2d 47, 52 (1972); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky.
1969); Bermes v. Facell, 328 So. 2d 722, 725 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Weeks v. Slavick
Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 627, 180 N.W.2d 503, 506 (1970), affld on other
grounds, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co.,
429 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. 1972); Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 318-19, 214
N.W.2d 925, 926 (1974); Norton v. Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 436, 342 A.2d 629, 630
(1975); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965);
Centrella v. Holland Constr. Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 537, 539, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834
(1975); Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 435, 215 S.E.2d 102, 110 (1975); Dobler v.
Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510, 517 (N.D. 1973); Tibbs v. National Homes Constr. Corp.,
52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 293, 369 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (1977); Jeanguneat v. Jackie
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ognizing that the intrinsic inequities of the doctrine of caveat
emptor are also manifest in real property.6
Recently, state legislatures have begun to follow the lead of
the judiciary by providing statutory protections for purchasers
of homes.7 In 1977, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a hous-
Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla. 1978); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or.
635, 640, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 128, 288 A.2d
771, 777 (1972); Padula v. J. J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.L 29, 32, 298 A.2d 529,
532 (1973); Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 502, 229 S.E.2d 728, 729
(1976); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 68, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809
(1967); Hollen v. Leadership Homes, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 305, 262 A.2d 461, 467 (1970); Klos v. Gock-
el, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 570, 554 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1976); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d
1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975). Cf. Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 469-72
(Miss. 1974) (majority of court recognizing implied warranty for first purchas-
ers of new homes in concurring and dissenting opinions).
Three of these states have supplemented the common law by enacting stat-
utory warranties. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-116 to -120 (West 1978); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520-2544 (West 1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3B-1 to -12
(West Supp. 1979). Two other states have passed statutory warranties without
prior encouragement from their courts. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-
201 to -205 (1974 & Supp. 1978); MmN. STAT. §§ 327A01-.07 (1978). Only two
states, by expressly rejecting implied housing warranties, have retained the
doctrine of caveat emptor. See P.B.R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Perren, 243 Ga. 280,
253 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1979); Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa 118, 126, 106 N.W.2d 59,
64 (1960). The remaining eleven states, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin, have not yet addressed the issue.
6. This Note will not examine the origins or rationale of the implied war-
ranty doctrine. The implied warranty/caveat emptor debate and the emergence
of implied warranty concepts with respect to new housing have been more than
adequately documented. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961); Bixby, Let
the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchase of a Defective Home, 49 J. URB. L.
533 (1971); Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular
Purpose, 37 MINN. L. REV. 108 (1953); Dworkin, Consumer Protection and the
Problems of Substandard New Houses, 28 CoNy. (n.s.) 276 (1964); Harris,
Builder's, Owner's and Landlord's Liability, 24 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 44 (Win-
ter 1974); Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1965); Jaeger, An Emerging Concept: Consumer Pro-
tection in Statutory Regulatio, Products Liability and the Sale of New Homes,
11 VAL U. L. REV. 335 (1977); McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New-House
Construction Revisited, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 136 (1974); Roberts, The Unwary Home
Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1970); Young &
Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat Venditor?, 24 ARK. L. REV. 245
(1970).
7. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-116 to -120 (West 1978); LA. Crv. CODE
ANN. art. 2520-2544 (West 1952); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to -205
(1974 & Supp. 1978); MiNN. STAT. §§ 327A.01-.07 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3B-1
to -12 (West Supp. 1979). Moreover, it is likely that further proposals for such
state legislation can be expected with increasing frequency. For example, the
Washington and Oregon legislatures have both begun consideration of home
warranty legislation. See Note, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of
Habitability-Explanation and Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REV. 185, 217 n.159
(1978) (Washington bill) [hereinafter cited as Note, Washington's New Home
[Vol. 64:413
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big warranties statute,8 which created implied warranties in
sales of new residential dwellings. The law provides initial and
subsequent purchasers of homes with a cause of action against
the builder if certain statutorily defined warranties are
breached. The statute has received little critical examination.9
This Note examines the nature and coverage of the Minne-
sota housing warranties statute. The shortcomings of the stat-
ute are demonstrated through comparison of the Minnesota act
with its closest counterparts,lO the New Jersey new home war-
Implied Warranty]; Interview with Cecilia Kramer, Home Owners Warranty
Council of Minnesota, in St. Paul, Minnesota (Sept. 11, 1979) (Oregon consider-
ation). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws re-
cently approved the Uniform Land Transactions Act which essentially extends
the Uniform Commercial Code, including the implied warranties of section 2-
314 and section 2-315, to real property transactions. See Note, Warranties in the
Uniform Land Transactions Act of 1975-Progression or Retrogression for Penn-
sylvania?, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 162, 166-68 (1975). Since the approval of such a pro-
posal by the commission obligates each commissioner to work for its
enactment in his state, legislators in each state are now faced with the question
of whether to statutorily warrant new houses. Federal interest in this area ex-
isted as early as 1973, when Senator Philip A. Hart introduced the Truth-In-
Housing Act, S. 2028, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The Hart bill would have
mandated written disclosure of defects that would seriously affect the useful-
ness and habitability of the housing unit. Failure to disclose defects that are
actually or constructively known to the seller would have been grounds for re-
covery of damages by the buyer. Id. See also Note, The Home Owners War-
ranty Program: An Initial Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 357, 358-59 n.7 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program]. Elizabeth
Dole, a member of the Federal Trade Commission, warned in a speech to the
1979 Convention of the National Association of Home Builders that
homebuilders must construct better homes and make self-regulation work or
else brace themselves "for full-scale, hardhitting regulation from the govern-
ment." Minneapolis Tribune, Jan. 22, 1979, at 9A, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Dole Speech].
8. Act of May 5, 1977, ch. 65, 1977 Minn. Laws 107 (codified as MINN. STAT.
§§ 327A.01-.07, 541.051 (1978)).
9. As of February 5, 1980, no action under the Minnesota new home war-
ranties statute had been taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
10. The Minnesota and New Jersey statutes and HOW represent one of the
two major forms of statutorily implied warranties. They attempt to define in
some detail the scope of the warranty protection and extend that protection to
most aspects of the new home through a three-tiered system. The other form,
utilized by Maryland, Connecticut, and the Uniform Land Transaction Act,
adds a general warranty of materials and workmanship to a restatement of the
implied warranty of habitability. Maryland was the first state to enact a statute
of this type and the language it employed is typicab
[I]n every sale, warranties are implied that ... the improvement is:
(1) Free from faulty materials;
(2) Constructed according to sound engineering standards;
13/ Constructed in a workmanlike manner; and
Fit for habitation.
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(a) (Supp. 1978). The Uniform Land Trans-
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ranties statute" and a private scheme for new home protection,
the National Association of Home Builders' Home Owners War-
ranty program (HOW).12 In response to the perceived inade-
quacies of the Minnesota warranty plan, this Note proposes a
Model Statute.13 The Model Statute sets forth efficient war-
ranty protections for new houses through a state-mandated,
state-regulated program of privately managed new home war-
ranty insurance.
II. DESCRIPTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
MINNESOTA STATUTE
Although some form of judicially implied warranty on new
homes has been established in many states,14 there is a paucity
of Minnesota case law on such warranties. In Robertson Lum-
ber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co.,15 the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that under certain circum-
stances a warranty of fitness-for-purpose would be implied in
construction contracts.16 Although the court hinted that war-
action Act extends this coverage for a period of six years. See UNIFORM LAND
TRANSACTION ACT §§ 2309, 2-521(a)-(b). The Connecticut and Maryland warran-
ties, however, are good for only one year. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-
118(e) (West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-204(b) (Supp. 1978). Mary-
land does allow two additional years in which to bring the suit. See id. § 10-
204(c). Maryland and Connecticut also exclude coverage of conditions that "a
reasonably diligent purchaser" could have discovered at the time of purchase.
See id. § 10-203(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118(b) (West 1978). It is beyond
the scope of this Note to comment extensively on these three relatively terse
warranty provisions, other than to mention that their coverage is generally sim-
ilar to that of the first group, although more vaguely defined and for a generally
shorter period. See generally Note, Warranties in the Unif/rm Land Transac-
tion Act of 1975-Progression or Retrogression for Pennsylvania?, 49 TEmFLE
L.Q. 162 (1975).
Louisiana employs the doctrine of redhibition to achieve results similar to
those under the statutory home warranties in other states. Redhibition allows
a buyer to void a sale or seek a reduction in price upon discovery of a defect in
the item purchased. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2520-2521, 2544 (West 1952).
An actionable defect must be latent, unknown to the buyer, defective at the
time of transfer, and such that the buyer would not have purchased the house
had he known of the defect, or at least would not have purchased at that price.
Bermes v. Facell, 328 So. 2d 722, 725 (La. Ct. App. 1976). See also Haskell, supra
note 5, at 645; Annot., 25 AL.R.3d 383, 425-26 (1969).
11. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46.3B-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1979).
12. For a comprehensive discussion of HOW, see Note, The Home Owners
Warranty Program, supra note 7.
13. While the model statute follows the structure of the current Minnesota
new home warranties statute, MmN. STAT. §§ 327A.01-.07 (1978), it is designed to
be suitable for adoption in any state.
14. See note 5 supra.
15. 274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622 (1966).
16. The requisite circumstances are:
[Vol. 64.413
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ranties might also be implied in the purchase of new homes,
the case itself extended such warranties only to construction
contracts.' 7 Moreover, despite the court's use of general lan-
guage applicable to any "building," the case involved a grain
storage bin,18 and thus the implied warranty could arguably be
limited to commercial buildings. By 1977, no cases involving
claims of residential implied warranty had been appealed to
the Minnesota Supreme Court.19 Given the absence of a clear
judicial indication that purchasers of homes would be protected
under Minnesota case law, it is therefore not surprising that, in
1977, the Minnesota Legislature passed a statute establishing
(1) the contractor holds himself out, expressly or by implication, as
competent to undertake the contract; and the owner (2) has no particu-
lar expertise in the kind of work contemplated; (3) furnishes no plans,
design, specifications, details, or blueprints; and (4) tacitly or specifi-
cally indicates his reliance on the experience and skill of the contrac-
tor, after making known to him the specific purposes for which the
building is intended.
Id. at 24, 143 N.W.2d at 626.
17. See id. at 23, 143 N.W.2d at 626. In addition to noting the similarity be-
tween one who purchases a house and one who contracts for house construc-
tion, the court cites articles that call for the abandonment of caveat emptor in
the real property field. See id. at 23 n.6, 143 N.W.2d at 626 n.6. Moreover, the
court states, "In Minnesota we have consistently noted that the doctrine of im-
plied warranty is to be liberally construed." Id. at 23, 143 N.W.2d at 626.
18. Id.
19. One can only speculate about why there have been no reported cases
involving claims of residential implied warranties in Minnesota. The quality of
new home construction in Minnesota may conceivably be so outstanding that
no defects result. Given the recent outcry against widespread shoddy construc-
tion, however, such an explanation seems highly doubtful. Speaking at the 1979
Convention of the National Association of Home Builders, Elizabeth Dole said,
"For too many Americans, the dream home has turned into a nightmare ....
As families move into their own little Garden of Eden, more and more are find-
ing the apple full of worms. In fact, new home defects now rank among the top
consumer problems in this country." Dole Speech, supra note 7, at 9A, col. 1.
One explanation for the lack of cases may be the high cost of litigation. A
homeowner faced with a defect must perform a cost-benefit analysis that bal-
ances the cost of remedying the defect with the expected value of a lawsuit.
When high court costs are added to the analysis, it seems unlikely that many
cases will be litigated, let alone appealed. This explanation is supported by the
fact that most of the cases establishing implied warranties were the result of
unusually severe and costly defects. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 47 Ala. App.
194, 196-97, 252 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (1970), affid, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971)
($10,000 for fire damage caused by defective wiring); Wawak v. Stewart, 247
Ark. 1093, 1094, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970) ($1309 for deficient heating and air
conditioning duct work); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 79, 388 P.2d 399,
400 (1964) ($9740.24 for structural damage); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743,
745 (Ky. 1969) ($6,000 for a wet basement).
1980]
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new home warranties. 20
The Minnesota statute provides that in a contract for the
sale of a new residential dwelling, the vendor impliedly war-
rants to the vendee protection against certain construction de-
fects.2 1 The scope of this protection is broadly defined by the
statute. "Vendor" includes any person, firm, or corporation
that constructs dwellings for the purpose of sale;22 "vendee" in-
cludes not only the initial purchaser of the dwelling, but also
any subsequent purchasers.23 Contracts for sale and contracts
for construction of a dwelling24 both trigger the warranty pro-
tections of the statute.25 Once triggered, the warranty is not re-
20. Act of May 5, 1977, ch. 65, 1977 Minn. Laws 107 (codified as MLINN. STAT.
§§ 327A.01-.07, 541.051 (1978)).
21. MINN. STAT. § 327A.02 (1978).
22. Id. § 327A.01(7). The definition of "vendor" only imposes liability on
the builder. Intermediaries, such as real estate developers, are not required to
warrant the house.
23. Id. § 327A.01(6). Section 327A.01, subdivision 4, defines the term "initial
vendee" as a "person who first contracts to purchase a dwelling from a vendor
for the purpose of habitation and not for resale in the ordinary course of trade."
This definition aids in identifying the actions an initial purchaser must take to
initiate the warranty period. See notes 25-26 infra.
A literal interpretation of the definitions of initial vendee and vendor
presents a minor problem. If a vendor sells the dwelling to a "straw," no war-
ranty is created because the "straw" has not contracted to purchase "for the
purpose of habitation." The "straw" is thus not an '"nitial vendee," and be-
cause he is obviously not a subsequent purchaser, he would not be a "Vendee"
under the statutory definition. Since the "straw" does not "construct dwellings
for the purpose of sale," he also does not qualify as a "vendor." Thus, no war-
ranty is created when the "straw" eventually sells the dwelling to a bona fide
purchaser. The net result is that no warranty accrues to the homeowner. Of
course, an enlightened court may consider the "straw" an agent of the vendor,
or may otherwise obviate the sham conveyance. Deleting the words "from a
vendor" from the definition of "initial vendee" would remedy the problem.
Some statutes deal expressly with this problem by making the sham transfer
ineffective as to the warranty. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-119 (West 1978);
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-205 (1979). Cf. UIFoRM LAND TRANSACTIONS
ACT § 2-309 (Commissioners' Comment No. 1) ("if the seller would be a person
in the business if he were making the sale himself, he cannot avoid that result
by selling through agents").
24. See MNiN. STAT. § 327A.02(1) (1978). This section expands the warranty
protection beyond that implied by the court in Robertson Lumber Co. v. Ste-
phen Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622 (1966) (implied
warranty for construction contracts). See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying
text.
25. Minnesota Statutes section 327A.01, subdivision 8, defines the warranty
date as "the date from and after which the statutory warranties provided in
section 327A.02 shall be effective, and is the earliest of (a) The date of the ini-
tial vendee's first occupancy of the dwelling; or (b) The date on which the ini-
tial vendee takes legal or equitable title in the dwelling." The contingent
condition in subparagraph (a) is clear; however, subparagraph (b) may lead to
unintended results. For example, the homebuyer may arrange to purchase a
partially completed dwelling on a contract for deed, and subsequently comple-
[Vol. 64:413
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stricted by the doctrine of privity; rather, it runs with the
dwelling.26 The term "dwelling," which further establishes the
scope of the statute, is also defined expansively.27 Although
the definition excludes commercial structures, 28 used dwell-
ings,29 and property components beyond the basic structure of
the house,30 it does include multi-family units, apartments, con-
tion of the dwelling is delayed for a year by a strike. Since the taking of equita-
ble title triggers the warranty, the one-year protections of section 327A.02(1) (a)
would expire before the house is completed. This problem could be alleviated
by amending subparagraph (b) of § 327A.01 (8) to read "if the initial vendee has
taken legal or equitable title in the dwelling, the date when the completed
structure is first made available for occupancy." See text accompanying note
152 infra.
26. Mnn. STAT. § 327A.01(6) (1978). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
In defining the party to whom the vendor warrants the dwelling, the statute
uses the term "vendee" rather than "initial vendee." MMN. STAT. § 372A.02(l)
(1978). The result is that the warranties run with the dwelling and not solely to
the initial vendee. Such a result abandons the doctrine of privity, which re-
quired a contractual relationship between the buyer and seller if the seller was
to be liable under an implied warranty theory. For a discussion of the privity
doctrine, see Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 95, 207 A.2d 314, 328
(1965).
27. See MiNN. STAT. § 327A.01(3) (1978).
28. Commercial structures are precluded by the phrase "constructed for
the purpose of habitation." Id. In order to ensure warranty protection, a dwell-
ing must not only be constructed for the purpose of habitation, but it must also
be used for that purpose. Section 327A.03, subdivision 1, excludes warranty
protection from any dwelling that is no longer used as a residence. MnN. STAT.
§ 327A.03(1) (1978).
29. Since statutory warranties run with the dwelling, see note 26 supra, a
used home that is purchased within the statutory period will be accorded pro-
tection. Homes over ten years old or built before January 1, 1978, however, are
not covered. See id. § 327A.02(c).
Traditionally, used homes were not protected under the common law. Re-
cently, some commentators have called for implying warranties on all used
homes. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 6, at 562; Haskell, supra note 6, at 650-52.
Haskell advocates emphasizing not the characteristics of the seller, but the
buyer's expectation that a fair price will obtain goods reasonably fit for the pur-
poses for which they are normally used. Id. at 649. In Casavant v. Campopiano,
114 R.L 24, 27, 327 A.2d 831, 833 (1974), a house was occupied for a year by a
tenant "to promote the sale by the builder-vendor." When the house was sub-
sequently sold to a permanent occupant, the court considered the house to be
new. The court intimated that it might imply warranties on used homes even
in the absence of such unusual circumstances. Id. at 27, 327 A.2d at 833. See
also Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 18 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972) ("We ponder, but do
not decide, what result would occur if more remote purchasers were involved.
We recognize that liability must have an end but question the creation of artifi-
cial limits of either time or remoteness to the original purchaser."). A less am-
bitious alternative to implied warranties is found in the City of Minneapolis
"Truth in the Sale of Housing" ordinance, MnmEAPos, MMN., CODE § 248.10-.20
(1978), which requires that prior to the sale of a used home, an evaluation
made by a specialist must be disclosed to prospective purchasers.
30. Warranty coverage is withheld from "appurtenant recreational facili-
1980]
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dominiums, and single-family units.31
If a transaction is within the scope of the statute, the
purchased dwelling is impliedly warranted in three ways. The
most comprehensive level of protection afforded the new home
buyer is the one-year warranty32 against defects "caused by
faulty workmanship and defective materials due to noncompli-
ance with building standards."33 Although the terms "faulty
workmanship" and "defective materials" have been given pre-
cise meanings through their use in the case law,34 the term
"building standards" is more ambiguous. "Building standards"
could refer to the loose collection of standard procedures fol-
lowed by similar builders in the locality,35 the nationwide trade
codes, 36 the state or local building codes,37 or some combina-
ties, detached garages, driveways, walkways, patios, boundary walls, retaining
walls not necessary for the structural stability of the dwelling, landscaping,
fences, nonpermanent construction materials, off-site improvements, and all
other similar items." MINN. STAT. § 327A.01(3) (1978).
31. The statute defines dwelling as a "new building ... constructed for the
purpose of habitation." Id. § 327A.01(3). The use of such general language, in
conjunction with the omission of more restrictive definitional terms such as
"house" or "single family dwelling," indicates that the drafters intended the
statute to apply to the entire range of dwellings, including apartment buildings,
multi-family structures, and condominiums. This is in keeping with a recent
trend away from the construction of the traditional single-family home. In 1950,
eighty-five percent of all housing starts were single-family homes. By 1971, that
percentage dropped to fifty-six percent. Sumichrast, Coming Up-Accelerated
Change in the Housing Market, 1972 REAL EST. REV. 52, 53. A recent National
Association of Home Builders survey also showed a remarkable increase in the
construction of townhouses and condominiums. See id.
32. Several commentators who have proposed model statutes maintain
that a longer period of comprehensive protection is preferable. For example,
Professor Haskell suggests that a five-year warranty should apply. See Haskell,
supra note 6, at 651-52. The authors of the Uniform Land Transactions Act rec-
ommend a six-year period for its warranty, while the Connecticut and Mary-
land statutes both provide one-year coverage. See note 10 supra. In general, it
seems that one-year coverage is appropriate for types of defects likely to be-
come apparent within that period, but that there should be longer coverage for
defects that are more difficult to discover.
33. MINN. STAT. § 327A.02(1) (a) (1978). The language of this section could
be made more precise by amending it to read: "free from defects caused by
faulty workmanship or defective materials where the defects result from non-
compliance with building standards" (emphasis not to be retained).
34. See cases cited in note 5 supra.
35. This is a negligence standard. See Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d
66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
36. Nationwide trade codes, prepared by the various trade associations, list
minimum acceptable specifications for a variety of construction tasks. There is
a wide variety of general plumbing, mechanical, and electrical codes. See gener-
ally HOME OWNERS WARRANTY CORPORATION, APPROVED STANDARDS 1-2 (1979)
(on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
37. A state building code has been promulgated in Minnesota pursuant to
MINN. STAT. §§ 16.83-.865, .866(2), .867 (1978). MINN. STAT. § 16.868 (Supp. 1979).
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tion of these three sets of standards. A reasonable interpreta-
tion of "building standards" would be a combination of state
and local building codes and local industry standards.38
The second level of protection provided by the Minnesota
statute is a two-year implied warranty against defects "caused
by faulty installation of plumbing, electrical, heating, and cool-
ing systems."39 The period of coverage for these systems was
extended apparently because such systems are normally in-
stalled by specialists and are concealed within the walls of the
structure.40 Not only does it generally take longer to discover a
See 2 Minn. Code of Agency Rules § 1.10101-.18901 (1978). For an example of a
local building code, see MmNEAPOIS, Mun., CODE §§ 85.10-117.130 (1978).
38. The legislature appears to have intentionally used a vague term. To
give the term some content, it seems sensible to incorporate standards that are
already well developed. To measure builder performance solely by local indus-
try practices, however, is to apply nothing more than a statutory negligence
standard. In fact, such a standard may even fall short of the negligence crite-
rion of reasonableness, since builders in a particular locality may routinely per-
form some construction tasks in an unreasonable manner. In addition,
inclusion of state and local building codes may not necessarily raise the stan-
dard above negligence. Violations of such codes might well have been actiona-
ble as negligence per se even without the statutory cause of action. The
inclusion of building codes, however, does seem to raise the standard above
reasonableness in at least some areas. Supplementation by building codes is
necessarily limited because of the narrow range and minimal requirements of
such codes. A standard of reasonableness, however, based on local practices
and building codes, seems to be the best standard that can be fashioned from
the present statutory language. Trade codes are clearly unsuitable for direct
use as a standard because they vary greatly in stringency of requirements, and
courts would have no fair method of choosing the codes to which builders must
adhere. It seems clear that the best method of determining the proper meaning
of "building standards" is to authorize the promulgation of definitional regula-
tions. See text accompanying note 144 infra. Until such a proposal is adopted,
homeowners who bring suit under the Minnesota act will encounter difficult
problems of proof in establishing the fault of the homebuilder.
Building codes have been adopted by some courts as a partial standard for
implied warranties of habitability even though such warranties ostensibly pro-
tect homeowners against only serious defects affecting the use of the building
as a home. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964)
('"There is an implied warranty that builder vendors have complied with the
building code of the area in which the structure is located."); Goggin v. Fox
Valley Constr. Corp., 48 Ill. App. 3d 103, 106, 365 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1977) ("in the
context of a contract for the sale of a new home,. . failure to comply with ap-
plicable building codes would constitute a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability"). But see Polson v. Martin, 228 Md. 343, 180 A.2d 295 (1962).
39. MINN. STAT. § 327A.02(1)(b) (1978).
40. A four-year period for installation would be analogous to protection
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for installation of goods.
See U.C.C. § 2-725. In O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826
(Minn. 1977), decided prior to the effective date of the new home warranty stat-
ute, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the faulty installation of a furnace
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defect in a concealed system, but once the defect is discovered,
repairs tend to be more expensive.41
The third level of protection is the ten-year coverage of
"major construction defects" which are defined as "actual dam-
age to the load-bearing portion of the dwelling ... which vi-
tally affects or is imminently likely to vitally affect the use of
the dwelling for residential purposes."42 This definition in-
volves a stringent two-pronged test. First, in order to be
deemed a "major construction defect," damage that has an ac-
tual effect on the load-bearing ability of the structure must be
found. Second, the damage must affect, or have the potential to
affect, the use of the dwelling for residential purposes. This
coverage is qualified by the exclusion of liability for "damage
due to movement of the soil caused by flood, earthquake or
other natural disaster."43 The ten-year period is unique since it
is considerably longer than the periods provided in most other
new home warranty statutes.44 One justification for such a pro-
tracted period of coverage is the severe loss that a homeowner
would suffer from a major construction defect.45 In addition,
was covered by the U.C.C. Id. at 831. Although this case involved the remodel-
ing of a used home, different treatment for new homes would be inconsistent.
Other courts have also held U.C.C. warranties applicable to the installation of
items similar to those covered in the two-year provision of the statute. See In-
surance Co. of N. America v. Radiant Elec. Co., 55 Mich. App. 410, 222 N.W.2d
323 (1974) (U.C.C. warranties applied to the installation of electrical wiring in
an apartment building); Worell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (leak-
ing gas fittings are "goods" within the purview of the U.C.C.). It is interesting
to note that both Radiant Electric and Worell applied the U.C.C.'s implied war-
ranties to secondary property damage. It may be that the U.C.C. provision will
effectively modify the two-year period of the Minnesota statute to four years.
41. The length of the warranty period is apparently a function of the cost
of repair and the probability of the defect occurring. See note 45 infra.
42. MmN. STAT. § 327A.01(5) (1978). This provision is a form of strict liabil-
ity. The builder is liable for all damage to the load-bearing capacity of the
dwelling, regardless of source, subject only to the exclusions of section 327A.03.
43. Id. § 327.01(5). This qualification is unnecessarily repetitive, since sec-
tion 327A.03(m) already excludes such defects.
44. See note 32 supra. But see text accompanying note 89 infra.
45. By definition, a major construction defect is one that will potentially
render a home uninhabitable. See MmnN. STAT. § 327A01(5) (1978). Obviously,
such defects must be repaired and might be quite expensive; unlike most mi-
nor defects, these defects cannot simply be absorbed into the market value of
the house.
It appears that the drafters of the statute were more concerned with the
possible magnitude of harm resulting from a defect than with the probability of
that defect occurring; they granted extended coverage to situations where the
severity of harm is substantial and the probability of occurrence is slight (ten
years of protection for load-bearing), but limited protection in situations where
the probability of defects is high and the harm is comparatively minimal (one
year of protection for noncompliance with building standards).
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damage to load-bearing elements of the structure may take
even longer to become apparent than defects in the plumbing,
electrical, or other basic systems of the house. 6 Such defects,
however, are likely to be rare and builders will seldom be re-
quired to redeem their warranty.4?
The scope of coverage of the statutory warranties is limited
by section 327A.03, which explicitly excludes certain items and
situations. 48 The proposition that the vendor should not be lia-
ble for events beyond his control is the rationale for many of
the exclusions in the provision. These exclusions include, inter
alia:49 "[1] oss or damage caused by defects in design, installa-
tion, or materials which the vendee supplied, installed, or had
installed under his direction";50 "[1] oss or damage from normal
wear and tear";5 1 "[I] oss or damage from dampness and con-
densation due to insufficient ventilation after occupancy";5 2
46. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
47. Jim Bergan, Legislative Chairman of the Minnesota Homebuilder Asso-
ciation, testified before the House Committee on Commerce and Economic De-
velopment on February 10, 1977, that to his knowledge there had been only one
instance of a major construction defect in Minnesota in the previous ten years.
This may indicate that few Minnesota homes are structurally impaired. An al-
ternative interpretation, however, is that the definition of major construction
defect is unduly stringent. Such a restrictive definition could potentially render
a major portion of the statute ineffective. In fact, Virginia Knauer, former Spe-
cial Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, warned against such inter-
pretation, in the context of the HOW plan: "If this term [major construction
defect] were defined so narrowly that it excluded some serious defects, the pro-
gram would be reduced to a charade." Address by Virginia Knaver, National
Association of Home Builders Annual Convention, in Houston, Texas (Jan. 22,
1974) (on fie with the Minnesota Law Review).
48. The statute's coverage is also limited by the definitions of statutory
terms. See MwN. STAT. § 327A.01 (1978). For a discussion of those terms, see
notes 22-31, 45 supra and accompanying text.
49. See also MINN. STAT. § 327A.03(g)-(j) (1978). These sections deal gener-
ally with improper maintenance or repair and improper landscaping or ground
grading by parties other than the vendor.
50. Id. § 327A.03(b). This subsection seems poorly drafted. A preferable
alternative would be: "Loss or damage where the defective design, installation,
or materials were requested or supervised by the vendee, provided that the se-
lection or supervision of the vendee is active and not a passive acquiescence in
the judgment of the vendor." This version clarifies the distinction between acts
of the vendor and vendee and is consistent with the rationale for this group of
exceptions.
51. Id. § 327A.03(d). Homeowners do occasionally ask homebuilders to re-
place burnt-out light bulbs. See Carter, Legislature Report, 1978 NEw HoMEs
16, 16 (Feb.-Mar.).
52. M IN. STAT. § 327A.03(f) (1978). A dangerous ambiguity is created by
use of the unqualified phrase "insufficient ventilation after occupation." If this
were taken literally, a vendor who constructed a dwelling that could not be
properly ventilated would escape liability. This presumably unintended result
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"[a]ccidental loss or damage usually described as acts of God
... except when the loss or damage is caused by failure to
comply with building standards";53 and "[1] oss or damage due
to soil conditions where construction is done upon lands owned
by the vendee and obtained by him from a source independent
of the vendor."54
Most of the remaining exclusions are similarly justifiable.
The builder is protected from stale claims by an exclusion for
"[1] oss or damage not reported by the vendee to the vendor in
writing within six months after the vendee discovers or should
have discovered the loss or damage."55 Moreover, since the
vendee should not be allowed to claim damages that he could
have prevented, there is an exclusion for "[loss or damage
which the vendee, whenever feasible, has not taken timely ac-
tion to minimize."56 Non-coverage of "[loss or damage from
normal shrinkage caused by the drying of the dwelling within
could be remedied by adding the phrase, "except where the insufficent ventila-
tion is caused by the vendor's failure to comply with building standards."
53. Id. § 327A.03(m). The examples given are "acts of God, including, but
not limited to: fire, explosion, smoke, water escape, windstorm, hail or light-
ning, falling trees, aircraft and vehicles, flood, and earthquake." I& See also id.
§ 327A.03(i) (mentioning "insect loss").
54. Id. § 327A.03(o). This provision appears to be drafted unsatisfactorily.
By its terms, it makes liability contingent on who owns the land at the time
construction begins. Presumably, the problem that the legislature intended to
address was the situation in which a vendee selected unsuitable land and hired
a contractor to build a house, which was later damaged by poor soil conditions.
The statutory language, however, is overbroad. The exception should be de-
leted and these circumstances covered under the proposed revision of
§ 327A.03(b), which exempts the vendor from the effects of design choices
made by the vendee. See note 50 supra. Alternatively, § 327A.03(o) could read*
"Loss or damage due to soil conditions where the unsafe soil condition was
known to the vendee, who directed the vendor to proceed with construction."
This would eliminate land ownership as a criterion of liability.
55. MINN. STAT. § 327A.03(a) (1978). Although such a limitation may seem
unnecessary because of the vendee's duty to mitigate and the vendor's un-
changed position, this provision can be justified by the difficulty the vendor
would otherwise have in proving the extent of the damage at the time of discov-
ery by the vendee.
56. Id. § 327A.03(h). Because of a poor choice of language, this subsection
implies that if the vendee does not take timely action to mitigate, he will lose
all compensation for any loss or damage, not just the compensation for the
marginal damage due to his own delay. A distinction between marginal and
original damage should be drawn, making the vendor liable for the damage that
occurred prior to accrual of the duty to mitigate. In addition, the statutory obli-
gation to mitigate "whenever feasible," is arguably broader, and thus more
stringent, than the usual contractual duty to make "reasonable" efforts to miti-
gate. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1039, at 241 (1964). Such an inter-
pretation of "feasible" would hinder the statutory objective of placing the
responsibility for homebuilder-caused defects on the homebuilder.
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tolerances of building standards" 57 appears meaningless since
only deviations from building standards are subject to the stat-
utory warranty. "Loss or damage from soil movement which is
compensated by legislation or covered by insurance" is ex-
cluded to prevent double recovery by a vendee.58 The exclu-
sion of "[1]andscaping or insect loss or damage" is simply an
adjunct to the legislative decision to cover only the residence
and not appurtenant facilities.5 9 The same rationale applies to
the exclusion of "[1]oss or damage which occurs after the
dwelling is no longer used primarily as a residence."60 Since
the rationale of the statute is the need to protect residences, 61
there is no reason to protect a dwelling after it ceases to be
used as a residence. The final exclusion pertains to
"[s]econdary loss or damage such as personal injury or prop-
erty damage." 62 These risks are excluded both because they
transcend the residence-protection rationale and because the
potential liability caused homebuilder opposition sufficient to
obstruct the passage of the statute.63
57. MINN. STAT. § 327A.03(e) (1978).
58. Id. § 327A.03(n). The vendor would not be expected to compensate
where the legislature has seen fit to deal with the subject. Although the phrase
"or covered by insurance" is acceptable under the present statute, it is deleted
in this Note's proposed Model Statute. Since insurance plans are the thrust of
the Model Statute, this innocuous phrase could potentially establish a "loop-
hole" that would swallow up the entire statute.
59. See id. § 373A.03(i). See also notes 78-81 infra and accompanying text.
The relationship between these two exclusions is unclear. If the reference to
"insect loss" pertains to insect damage to the landscaping or shrubbery, it is
redundant. If, however, it also includes damage to the residence, it cannot be
explained, except as part of the legislative focus on coverage of the residence.
Since the language is general, it must be assumed that the legislature meant to
exclude all insect loss, even that occurring to the house. That decision is ques-
tionable in that such insect loss may occur as a result of errors by the
homebuilder.
A better approach would be to delete this provision entirely. Landscaping
has already been excluded from the definition of dwelling contained in section
327A.01(3). Insect loss would be better included as part of the section exempt-
ing the vendor from damage caused by acts of God, subject to that provision's
exception "when the loss or damage is caused by failure to comply with build-
ing standards." See MmN. STAT. § 327A.03(m) (1978).
60. Id. § 327A.03(l). See note 28 supra.
61. See notes 79-81 infra and accompanying text.
62. MiNN. STAT. § 327A.03(c) (1978).
63. See note 157 infra. Only one court has allowed recovery for personal
injuries caused by a defective home. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J.
70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (mass producer of homes held liable under a strict liabil-
ity or an implied warranty theory for failing to install a mixing valve that
caused scalding water to burn a sixteen-month-old child).
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If the vendee is within the ambit of the warranty protec-
tions, section 327A.05 grants him a judicial cause of action.
Damages are limited to: "(a) [t]he amount necessary to rem-
edy the defect or breach; or (b) [t]he difference between the
value of the dwelling with the defect and the value of the dwell-
ing without the defect."64 The statute provides no guidance on
which alternative measure of damages should be applied in
particular cases; presumably, the court has discretion to award
either measure.65 Regardless of whether a vendee is within the
ambit of the statute, however, he is still entitled, pursuant to
section 327A.06, to other warranties imposed by law or agree-
ment.66 Moreover, a vendee may recover damages greater than
those allowed under section 327A.02 if he succeeds on a cause
of action not based on chapter 327A.67
Two sections of the statute allow partial or total avoidance
of the warranty provisions. Under certain circumstances, the
parties may agree to waive or modify the statutory warranties.
Even though section 327A.04 initially states that "[a]ny agree-
ment which purports to waive or modify the provisions of [this
statute] shall be void,"68 two exceptions are allowed. Subdivi-
64. Mum. STAT. § 327A.05 (1978).
65. Because section 327A.05 also permits a suit for specific performance,
damages should ordinarily consist of the reduction in value caused by the de-
fect. A vendee should not be permitted to obtain the amount that repair would
cost (an amount which usually would be greater or equal to the decrease in
value) when the vendor will perform the needed repair. He should only receive
such an amount in situations in which the vendor is unwilling or unable to
make proper repairs.
66. 'The statutory warranties provided for in section 327A.02 shall be in ad-
dition to all other warranties imposed by law or agreement." MINN. STAT.
§ 327A.A6 (1978). This provision prevents courts from interpreting the statutory
warranties as a signal that the legislature intended to preempt further judicial
action. Such an interpretation would stifle the development of common law
remedies for ills inadequately dealt with in the statute. Given the rapid pace of
change in this area of the law (in twenty-five years the courts have made the
transition from caveat emptor to nearly unanimous acceptance of implied war-
ranty principles), it is imperative to negate any notion of implied legislative
preemption.
67. This is clear from the language of section 327A.06, which states: "The
remedies provided in section 327A.05 shall not be construed as limiting the
remedies in any action not predicated upon breach of the statutory warranties
imposed by section 327A.02." MuN. STAT. § 327A.06 (1978).
68. MuN. STAT. § 327A.04(1) (1978) states:
Except as provided in subdivisions 2 and 3 of this section, the provi-
sions of sections 327A.01 to 327A.07 cannot be waived or modified by
contract or otherwise. Any agreement which purports to waive or mod-
ify the provisions of sections 327A.01 to 327A.07, except as provided in
subdivisions 2 and 3 of this section, shall be void.
The two sentences of this subdivision appear to be mere restatements of each
other. It would seem practical to combine the sentences to state: "Any agree-
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sion two of section 327A.04 allows modifications if certain de-
tailed procedures 69 are followed and if those modifications offer
"substantially the same protections. ' 70 Subdivision three of
section 327A.04 sets forth an extensive procedure for the waiver
of warranty coverage of certain major construction defects.71
The procedure is designed to ensure that the vendee is fully
ment which purports to waive or modify the provisions of this chapter by con-
tract or otherwise, except as provided in subdivision 2 and 3, shall be void."
69. The procedures require that the waiver or modification be made "by a
written instrument, printed in bold-face type of a minimum size of ten points,
which is signed by the vendee and which sets forth in detail the warranty in-
volved, the consent of the vendee, and the terms of the new agreement con-
tained in the writing." Id. § 327A.04(2).
The final sentence of subdivision two states that "[a] ny modification or ex-
clusion agreed to by vendee and vendor pursuant to this subdivision shall not
require the approval of the commissioner of administration pursuant to
327A.07." Id.. Unlike subdivision three, subdivision two does not require the
recording of the substitute warranty. It is unclear whether the substitute war-
ranties would be effective as to subsequent purchasers. See id. §§ 327A.01(6),
.02(l)-(2). A subsequent vendee may believe that the warranties agreed to by
the initial vendee are not, in fact, "substantially the same." He may feel enti-
tled to elect between the statutory protections and the express modification. In
the interests of fairness to the builder and increased certainty, the bargained-
for modifications should run with the land. Moreover, such modifications
should be recorded, in order to put the subsequent vendees on notice. If the
prospective purchaser is unhappy with the modifications, he has the option not
to purchase. The requirement of recording should therefore be deleted from
subdivision three and added to subdivision one: "Waivers under this section
shall not be effective unless filed for recording with the county recorder or reg-
istrar of titles who shall file the waiver for record."
70. The use of the phrase "substantially the same protections" generates
needless uncertainty regarding the legality of substitute warranties. Courts
will be forced to make post hoc determinations of the equivalence of the substi-
tutes to the statutory protections.
This uncertainty could easily result in litigation. For example, vendee and
vendor may agree that the vendee will waive warranty coverage of the central
air conditioning system that was installed by the vendor. As a quid pro quo,
vendor agrees to extend the two-year warranty of section 327A.02(1) (b) to two-
and-one-half years. Unfortunately, within two years of the warranty date the
air conditioning system breaks down as a result of faulty installation by the
vendor. The vendee subsequently seeks to void the substitute warranty on the
ground that the protections offered therein were not "substantially the same"
as the statutory minimums. The possibilities for such litigation appear virtu-
ally endless. A better approach would be to allow waivers or modifications only
if they enhance the statutory warranty protections. Thus, if the statutory war-
ranties were set forth as an invariable minimum, vexatious litigation concern-
ing equivalence would be avoided. An even better alternative would be to
adopt the Model Statute proposed in this Note; all builders must subscribe to a
state-approved warranty plan as a precondition to building, thereby eliminating
the need for individually bargained substitute warranties and gaining cost re-
ductions due to large volume. See also notes 76-77 infra and accompanying
text.
71. See Mum. STAT. § 327A.04(3) (1978).
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aware of both the nature and extent of the defect prior to
waiver. Only defects that are discovered prior to the sale of the
dwelling are eligible for a subdivision three waiver.7 2 Prior to a
waiver, a vendor must make "full oral disclosure of the specific
defect." The oral disclosure must then be authenticated by a
document that details the specific defect that is being waived,
the price reduction, the date construction was completed, and
the legal description of the dwelling, and that verifies the con-
sent of the vendee. Most importantly, the document must also
include the opinion of an independent appraiser on the differ-
ence between the value of the house with and without the de-
fect.73 Finally, subdivision three provides that a waiver will be
ineffective unless it is ffled.74 This procedure must be repeated
for each defect sought to be waived.7 5
The second means of circumventing the statute is the sec-
tion 327A.07 provision for Commissioner-approved variations.
The drafters of the statute attempted to provide some flexibility
by allowing for replacement of the statutory provisions with a
substitute plan that gives the same protections. 7 6 The Commis-
72. If such a defect is discovered subsequent to the sale, it must be reme-
died or the vendor will be liable for damages.
73. The real value of forced consultation with an appraiser is that as a
fresh voice, the appraiser can counteract the potential "puffing" by the vendor.
74. This requirement minimizes the possibility that the initial vendee will
capitalize on a subdivision three waiver. It is especially important with respect
to major construction defects since the warranty period is lengthy and any de-
fects are likely to be quite serious. Presumably a house with a documented
major construction defect can be purchased at a considerable discount. If a
waiver were not a matter of public record, the vendee might sell at a normal
price an unwarranted, defective dwelling without revealing the warranty
waiver.
75. One might wonder why waiver of such a crucial protection is allowed
at all; by definition, the defect vitally affects or threatens to vitally affect the
habitability of the dwelling. See MINN. STAT. § 327A.01(3) (1978). Without the
availability of a waiver, however, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to offer
substitute protections. A vendor would be forced to repair a house or forego a
sale because, in order to realize the current market value (original value minus
reduction due to defect), he would be required to offer the house at market
value or above to cover his potential liability under the warranty. Potential
vendees might well be reluctant to purchase a home under those conditions.
Even if the arrangement is acceptable to both parties, there may be some un-
certainty as to the eventual effects of the damage making precise evaluation
difficult. In such cases, it is advisable to allow the parties to negotiate their
own solution after full disclosure. This allowance for controlled risk-taking can
also be justified by the need to minimize the waste of housing resources that
would result if such houses were unmarketable.
76. Interview with Representative Michael Sieben, in Minneapolis, Minne-
sota (Nov. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Sieben Interview]. Representative
Sieben is the author of the Minnesota new home warranties statute, Act of May
5, 1977, ch. 65, 1977 Minn. Laws 107 (codified as MN. STAT. §§ 327A.01-.07, 541.05
(1978)). The basic premise behind the provision for commissioner-approved
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sioner, however, apparently has the discretion to refuse to con-
sider a plan, even if the plan appears to offer "substantially the
same protections." 77
It is useful, when examining the Act's provisions, to at-
tempt to identify the Minnesota Legislature's objectives in de-
termining the scope of the new home warranty statute. The
courts that first abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor gen-
erally substituted an implied warranty of habitability.78 More
recently, the consumer protection movement has strongly
urged that vendors be required to provide goods capable of sat-
isfying the reasonable expectations of consumers. An examina-
tion of the Minnesota statute, however, indicates that the
variations is to free the vendor from individual negotiation on issues of waiver
and modification. A vendor who wishes to allocate risk in a different manner
than is prescribed by the statute can have his substitute warranty plan ap-
proved by the state. In that way, the vendor may then impose his substitute
plan on all future vendees. Unfortunately, the legislature again used the
phrase "substantially the same protections." MINN. STAT. § 327A.07 (1978). This
concept is inherently vague and therefore tends to result in unnecessary litiga-
tion. See note 70 supra. However, since the decision is made prior to the im-
plementation of the substitute program, and since a presumption of expertise
would typically shield the administrator's decision from a probing judicial re-
view, the phrase would foster less litigation than would § 327A.04(2). Neverthe-
less, although it might be desirable to allow individual vendors to develop
substitute warranties that allocate risk in a manner more acceptable to them, it
also seems desirable not to defeat the warranty provisions developed by the
legislature. Therefore, a statutory limit on approval of substitute warranty
plans to only those plans that exceed the statutory protections would be more
consonant with the legislative purpose.
77. MIN. STAT. § 327A.07 (1978). Insofar as the section is intended to free
the vendor from having to negotiate individual substitute warranties, as in
§ 327A.04(2), it has, at times, failed to achieve its purpose because of the discre-
tion it affords the Commissioner. Section 327A.07 states that "[t]he commis-
sioner of administration may approve ... variations." Id. (emphasis
supplied). At least one former Commissioner of Administration has used this
discretion and has refused to consider any submitted substitute warranty pro-
grams, apparently because of inadequate funding and staff shortages. Tele-
phone interview with Gerry Regan, Director of the Minnesota HOW program,
in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Oct. 26, 1978). See also Letter from Richard L.
Brubacher, Minnesota Commissioner of Administration, to Richard Martin, At-
torney for Centex Corporation of Dallas, Texas (a national homebuilder) (Apr.
11, 1978) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). There are two steps that, if
taken, would further the purposes of the statute in this regard. First, the stat-
ute should provide for adequate funding to insure that its requirements can be
fulfilled. Second, "shall" should replace "may"; the Commissioner then would,
at the very least, be forced to issue an opinion as to the permissibility of indi-
vidual proposed substitute warranties.
78. See, e.g., Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 128, 288 A.2d 771, 777 (1972);
Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 RI. 29, 32, 298 A.2d 529, 532 (1973); Hol-
len v. Leadership Homes, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). See
generally cases cited in note 5 supra.
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legislature was pursuing a goal that lies between these two
objectives.79 The statute transcends a habitability rationale in
that it warrants against defects that do not affect the use of the
home for habitation.80 On the other hand, the exclusion of
items such as appurtenant facilities and secondary damage in-
dicates that the legislature was unwilling to force homebuilders
to reimburse consumers for all damage due to defective con-
struction.81 The legislative motivation is best described as "res-
idence protection": a desire to insulate homeowners from
egregious construction defects.
I. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA
NEW HOME WARRANTIES STATUTE
The Minnesota statute is a significant improvement in new
home statutory warranties. An examination of the alternative
approaches of the New Jersey New Home Warranties Act and
the HOW program, however, illuminates weaknesses in the
79. The distinction between the habitability and reasonable consumer ex-
pectation rationales is illustrated by the treatment of garages under the statute.
Section 327A.01(3) specifically excludes detached garages from the statutory
coverage; attached garages, however, would be included as part of the building
constituting the dwelling. This interpretation conforms to the habitability ra-
tionale, since defects in a detached garage are not likely to affect one's ability
to live in the house, while defects in an attached garage may affect the struc-
ture of the house and, hence, its habitability. The consumer expectation ration-
ale would require coverage of both types of garages since a consumer would
expect them to be fit for their intended purpose. The statutory scheme there-
fore encompasses the items covered under warranties of habitability, but stops
short of adopting a consumer expectation rationale.
The Washington Supreme Court has articulated a good example of this dis-
tinction:
[Tihe buckling and sinking of the front yard patio slabs [do not] affect
the habitability of the house, and are not structural defects affecting
habitability.... The law of implied warranty is not broad enough to
make the builder-vendor of a house absolutely liable for all mishaps oc-
curring within the boundaries of the improved real property.
Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 571-72, 554 P.2d 1349, 1352-53 (1976). Another
Washington court, however, has stretched habitability coverage beyond its
usual limits in an apparent attempt to fulfill consumer expectations. See Gay v.
Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 596-97, 494 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1972) (damages awarded
on theory of implied warranty of habitability for an inadequate driveway
drainfield). See also Note, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty, supra
note 7, at 196-97 (discussing Klos and Gay).
Even if the Minnesota statute does not encompass the consumer expecta-
tion rationale, it clearly extends well beyond the scope of the habitability ra-
tionale. Defective fixtures within the house are covered by a one- or two-year
warranty even if the flaw does not render the house uninhabitable. Thus, for
example, cupboards that separate from the wall would probably be covered de-
spite the fact that the house would be habitable without them.
80. See note 79 supra.
81. See id.
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Minnesota Act. The existence of these flaws justifies the for-
mulation of an improved statutory scheme that would ensure
adequate residence protection to new home purchasers in Min-
nesota.
A. THE NEW JERSEY APPROACH
The warranty provisions of the New Jersey New Home
Warranty and Builders' Registration Act82 are quite similar to
the protections afforded by the Minnesota statute.83 A one-year
implied warranty exists for "defects caused by faulty workman-
ship and defective materials due to noncompliance with the
building standards."84 In contrast to Minnesota's ambiguous
definition of "building standards," however, New Jersey re-
stricts the scope to the "standards" that are approved by the
Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs.85 The
Commissioner must promulgate "standards for construction
and of quality for the structural elements and components of a
new home with an indication, where appropriate, of what de-
gree of noncompliance with such standards shall constitute a
defect."8 6 The New Jersey statute also provides a two-year
warranty against defects caused by faulty installation of plumb-
ing, electrical, heating, and cooling delivery systems. 87 The
only difference from the two-year warranty in the Minnesota
statute is that appliance coverage is limited to the length and
scope of the warranty offered by the manufacturers.8 8 Finally,
a ten-year warranty against major construction defects, similar
to that of the Minnesota Act, is established.89
Although the time periods of the warranties in the Minne-
sota and New Jersey statutes are identical, the method of pro-
mulgation of the warranty is substantially different. In the
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3B-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1979). The Act became ef-
fective on September 3, 1978.
83. Although the New Jersey statute is replete with ambiguities, this Note
neither explores those ambiguities in depth, nor does it discuss minor defini-
tional variations. Discussion of the New Jersey statute in this section is for the
purpose of comparison with the Minnesota statute.
84. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3(b) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
85. "Commissioner" is defined as the Commissioner of the Department of
Community Affairs. Id. § 46:3B-2(b).
86. Id. § 46:3B-3(a). Since it is difficult to anticipate every defect that could
possibly occur, there are loopholes in this statutory provision.
87. Id. § 46:3B-3(b) (2).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 46:3B-3(b) (3).
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Minnesota statute the definitions of the warranty protections
are explicitly set forth. The New Jersey statute, on the other
hand, authorizes the Commissioner to prescribe by rule or reg-
ulation the details of the actual new home warranty,90 and sub-
sequently to modify the initial regulations. The New Jersey
plan is thus the more flexible of the two plans.9 1
Other New Jersey provisions have no parallel in the Minne-
sota statute. For instance, the New Jersey statute establishes a
new home warranty security fund-a pool of builder contribu-
tions set up to ensure that homeowners collect on meritorious
claims when their builder is either unable to, or simply will not,
remedy the defect.92 The fund is formed by assessing builders
amounts "sufficient to cover anticipated claims, to provide a
reasonable reserve and to cover the costs of administering the
fund."93 If the fund becomes inadequate, the Commissioner is
mandated to replenish it by assessing additional amounts.4
Furthermore, builders responsible for a "significant" number of
awards may be assessed surcharges. 95 All builders are re-
quired to register with the state and, as a precondition to regis-
tration, they must participate in the new home warranty
security fund or an approved substitute plan.96
A second difference is the provision for an informal com-
plaint procedure in the New Jersey act.9 7 In following the pro-
cedure, the owner must first attempt to secure voluntary repair
by the builder. If the builder fails to make satisfactory repairs
within a reasonable time, the owner may then file a claim
against the fund. The Commissioner is authorized to "investi-
gate each claim to determine the validity thereof ... and shall
hold a hearing if requested by either party." In addition, the
claim is "reviewed through a conciliation or arbitration proce-
dure by the department." If the owner's claim is found to be
meritorious, the builder is required to correct the defect. When
a builder is unable or willfully refuses to correct the deficiency,
90. Id. § 46:3B-3(a).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 46:3B-7(a).
93. Id. § 46:3B-7(b). Management of the fund is the responsibility of the
State Treasurer. Id.
94. Id. § 46:3B-7(d).
95. See id. Builders that are responsible for an "excessive" number of
awards can be denied participation, which means that they cannot build. See
note 99 infra and accompanying text.
96. N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:3B-5 (West Supp. 1979). For each home constructed
without a certification of registration, the builder is subject to a fine of up to
$2000. See id. § 46:3B-5, -12.
97. Id. § 46:3B-7(c).
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the new home warranty security fund pays the homeowner.98
The Commissioner may then suspend or revoke the nonpaying
builder's registration, thus preventing the builder from operat-
ing in the state. The Commissioner is not, however, authorized
to sue the builder for the amount paid to the owner.9 9 Al-
though the procedure provides the homeowner with a relatively
informal and thus inexpensive means of asserting claims, the
homeowner must be wary in selecting his remedies because,
under the statute, "initiation of procedures to enforce a remedy
shall constitute an election which shall bar the owner from all
other remedies."100
The New Jersey statute also differs from the Minnesota
98. Id.
The amount of the award shall be sufficient to cover the reasonable
costs necessary to correct any defect or defects covered under the war-
ranty, but the total amount of awards from the fund for any new home
shall not exceed the purchase price of the home in the first good faith
sale thereof or the fair market value of the home on its completion date
if there is no good faith sale.
Id.
99. If the builder does not satisfy legitimate claims, the Commissioner
may, after affording the builder an opportunity for a hearing, deny, suspend, or
revoke any certificate of registration. Other transgressions that are subject to
such a penalty include having
(1) Willfully made a misstatement of a material fact in his appli-
cation for registration or renewal;
(2) Willfully committed fraud in the practice of his occupation;
(3) Practiced his occupation in a grossly negligent manner;
(4) Willfully violated any applicable building code to substantial
degree;
(5) Failed to continue his participation in the new home warranty
security fund or an approved alternate new home warranty security
program after proper notice from the commissioner in writing by certi-
fied mail; or
(6) Violated any provision of this act or any rule or regulation
adopted pursuant thereto, after proper notice from the commissioner
in writing by certified maiL
Id. at 46:3B-6(b).
100. Id. at 46:3B-9. The New Jersey homeowner thus must make a careful
determination of the likelihood of success of each possible remedy. Other judi-
cial courses of action include suits under theories of express warranty, implied
warranty, see generally Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program, supra note
7, at 363-68, and manufacturers' warranty as defined by the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
Although under most circumstances it would be more beneficial to use the
informal procedures set forth in the New Jersey statute, see notes 97-99 supra
and accompanying text, the attractiveness of a judicial cause of action has re-
cently been enhanced by New Jersey case law. In McDonald v. Mianecki, 79
N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283, 1294-95 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability applied to all builder vendors
and included the potability of the water supply.
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statute in requiring the Commissioner to review and approve
all alternative programs: "If the Commissioner finds that a new
home warranty security program provides coverage and
financial security at least equivalent to the new home warranty
security fund, he shall approve the program."'01 Applicants
may also force the Commissioner to grant them a hearing on
their application. 0 2 The Commissioner may, however, revoke
or suspend the approval of an alternate plan "if he finds the
program no longer provides coverage and financial security
equivalent to the new home warranty security fund."103
B. THE HOME OWNERS WARRANTY CORPORATION APPROACH
The Home Owners Warranty program (HOW) is a private
new home warranty plan developed and operated by the Na-
tional Association of Home Builders. 0 4 The plan, patterned af-
ter the highly successful program of the National House-
Building Council of Great Britain, has been widely praised.105
HOW was the model for both the Minnesota and New Jersey
statutory warranties; all three plans include one-year coverage
of defects due to builder noncompliance with building stan-
dards, two-year protection for installation of plumbing, electri-
cal, heating, and cooling systems, and ten-year protection
against major construction defects. Under HOW, the builder
pays an initial insurance premium that guarantees his perform-
ance under the warranty for the full period.106 The builder pro-
vides the warranty for the first two years, and the insurer
directly insures against major construction defects for an addi-
tional eight years. 07
101. N.J. STAT. ANN § 46:3B-8 (West Supp. 1979).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The program is administered through a national home owner's war-
ranty corporation and local home owner's warranty councils. See Home Own-
ers Warranty Council of Minnesota, Program Description 1 (1979) (on file with
the Minnesota Law Review). The HOW program is extensively discussed in
Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program, supra note 7.
105. Many groups have even replaced their own requirements with HOW
provisions. Examples are the Veterans Administration, see Home Owners War-
ranty Corporation News Release 2 (Nov. 1978); the Federal Trade Commission,
see id.; the Department of Housing and Urban Development, see id.; and sav-
ings and loan associations, see U.S. Savings and Loans find HOW beneficial to
the lender, Savings and Loans News (Aug. 1978) (on file with the Minnesota
Law Review).
106. HOME OwNERs WARRANTY CoRP., LnITD WARRANrY-HoM WAR-
RAY AGREEMENT 5 (1979) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) [herein-
after cited as HOW WARRANTY AGREEMENT].
107. Id. at 5.
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If a defect should arise, HOW provides an inexpensive
mechanism for consumer complaints: a conciliation/arbitration
procedure. The vendee first submits a "clear and specific writ-
ten complaint" 08 which the builder must receive no later than
thirty days after the warranty on the defective item expires. If
the vendor fails to respond or disputes his obligations under
the agreement, the vendee may request an informal dispute
settlement from the local HOW council. The council assigns a
conciliator, who meets with the two parties in an attempt to
reach a mutually satisfactory solution. If these efforts fail, the
vendee may demand arbitration conducted by the American
Arbitration Association or a similar organization. If the vendee
decides to accept the arbitrator's decision, it is binding on the
vendor; the vendor, however, may not bind the vendee. A ven-
dee who refuses to accept the arbitrator's decision, and who re-
mains unsatisfied, may then pursue any available legal
remedies. If the vendor will not cooperate or will not perform
as directed, the insurer may arrange for performance of the
warranty obligations. When the insurer must satisfy the claim,
the vendee's rights are subrogated to the insurance com-
pany. 0 9
C. CRIrricAL ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA APPROACH
Comparison of the Minnesota statute with the New Jersey
statute and HOW reveals three major weaknesses in the Min-
nesota statute: the rigidity resulting from exclusively statutory
definition of the warranty protections, the absence of an infor-
mal, inexpensive complaint-resolution process, and the lack of
protection of homeowners from builder insolvency.
The first major flaw in the Minnesota statute is the inclu-
sion of explicit warranties within the text of the statute; this
creates unnecessary rigidity"l0 in a rapidly changing area of
law."' The New Jersey statute provides more flexibility by au-
thorizing an administrative body to define the extent of the
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 6-7.
110. Alteration of statutory warranty provisions currently requires the diffi-
cult, time-consuming, and expensive task of statutory amendment.
111. The rapid transformation of the common law is described in notes 1-6
supra and accompanying text.
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warranty program through rulemaking." 2 There are a number
of advantages to this approach. Administrative agencies are
generally better than legislative bodies at responding to
changed circumstances and reflecting experience through in-
cremental improvements." 3 Furthermore, the changes would
be promulgated by experts who are more qualified to weigh
policy considerations and assess current developments in the
field than are legislators." 4 Another advantage of placing the
warranty program under administrative control is the interpre-
tive ability of the agency. A statutory warranty must be con-
strued, and the judicial process of statutory construction is
uncertain, time-consuming, expensive, and docket-straining." 5
An administrative agency, on the other hand, need not wait for
litigation. As questions are raised, either formally or infor-
mally, the agency can issue rules and interpretations, or offer
examples to clarify the scope of warranty protections." 6 Min-
nesota already provides for some administrative interaction
112. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-3 (West Supp. 1979). See notes 90-91 supra
and accompanying text.
113. Although the Minnesota statute expressly negates any intent of statu-
tory preemption of the new home warranty field, see MINN. STAT. § 327A.06
(1978); notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text, courts may nevertheless be
reluctant to act when the legislature has spoken so recently. To compensate
for this reluctance, an agency should have the task of ensuring that the statute
remains current.
114. For a discussion of the attributes of administrative agencies, see K. DA-
vis, ADnmsmTRATrvE LAw TExr 11-15 (1972).
115. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 750 (1958).
116. For a description of the beneficial aspects of prospective rulemaking,
see Gifford, Report on Administrative Law to the Tennessee Law Revision Com-
mission, 20 VAND. L. REv. 777, 784-85 (1967). The advantages of rulemaking may
be somewhat diminished in Minnesota since the Minnesota Administrative
Procedure Act (MAPA), MmN. STAT. §§ 15.0411-.052 (1978), provides only for
"formal" rulemaking. See id. Insofar as such rulemaking requires a public
hearing, it differs from "informal" or "notice and comment" rulemaking avail-
able under other administrative procedure acts. See, e.g., Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976), as amended by Act of
Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, §§ 1-3, 92 Stat. 183, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 183; Privacy Act of 1977, Pub. L No. 95-38, 92 Stat. 197
(1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 179. Dean Carl A.
Auerbach has criticized the rulemaking procedures of the Minnesota statute:
The rulemaking process prescribed by the Minnesota Administrative
Procedure Act (MAPA) is unnecessarily complicated, cumbersome,
costly, and time-consuming. It scatters authority and responsibility
and discourages rulemaking, without which there can be no effective
and efficient administration of state government....
Unlike the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (FAPA), MAPA
does not distinguish between informal or notice-and-comment
rulemaking and formal or on-the-record rulemaking .... In my judg-
ment, the existing rulemaking provisions of MAPA should be scrapped.
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with the statutory warranties by allowing the Commissioner of
Administration to approve substitute warranty plans, but such
interaction has not occurred, because the language of the stat-
ute is precatory.117 Merger of the Commissioner's power to ap-
prove alternative programs with the power to interpret the
statute and promulgate rules would secure all the advantages
of prospective rulemaking.118 There are, however, disadvan-
tages inherent in a statute that merely instructs the Commis-
sioner to promulgate a warranty plan. The agency might fail to
formulate an adequate plan1 9 or reach beyond the sphere in-
tended by the legislature. An intermediate position in which
the legislature provides the basic statutory protection and the
administrative body is given the power to interpret and supple-
ment those protections is preferable. In the context of the Min-
nesota statute, this intermediate approach would allow the
warranties of section 327A.02 to provide minimal statutory pro-
tections, with the exclusions of section 327A.03 preventing the
agency from straying from the statutory purpose. Within this
framework, the agency would be free to modify and interpret
the warranty protections. 120
The second major drawback of the Minnesota statute is
that relief for the homeowner lies solely in actual or threatened
litigation-an expensive and time-consuming process. 12 1 Given
the choice between a thousand-dollar repair cost and an uncer-
tain amount of attorney's fees, the vendee might well decide to
abandon his legitimate warranty claim and pay for the repair
himself, even if he is certain that he will win. Any chance of
failure will make the vendee even less likely to pursue his
claim. As a result, vendors may routinely begin to ignore meri-
torious claims, since vendees, absent substantial monetary loss,
will rarely find it worthwhile to bring suit. The opportunity to
pursue an action in small claims court may alleviate the prob-
lem to some extent in Minnesota,122 but recovery on many
Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151, 152-
54 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
117. See MrNN. STAT. § 327A.07 (1978); note 77 supra and accompanying text.
118. See note 116 supra.
119. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
120. The agency would, of course, also be subject to judicial supervision and
legislative control.
121. The prohibitive cost of litigation may account for the absence of com-
mon law new home warranties in Minnesota. See note 19 supra.
122. The governing body of any city may, by resolution, establish a concilia-
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claims will be at the discretion of the vendor rather than forced
by the protections of the statutory warranties.
The informal settlement procedure of the New Jersey stat-
ute, adopted from HOW, provides a remedy superior to the ju-
dicial recourse available under the Minnesota statute. The
conciliation/arbitration procedure set forth in the New Jersey
statute123 reflects the belief that often all that is required is the
inclusion of an impartial third party, even one whose efforts are
merely advisory, to break stalemates between builders and
owners. Arbitration usually provides the advantages of
speed,124 economy, expertise, privacy, informality, convenience,
and fairness. 25 Moreover, the arbitration procedure is en-
hanced by the strong incentive for builder compliance in the
HOW program. If a builder fails to comply with the self-polic-
ing standards, he is denied further participation in the pro-
gram. 126 Similarly, if a New Jersey builder constructs an
tion court. The procedures in these courts are informal and are designed to
permit easy access to a judicial remedy. MmN. STAT. §§ 491.01-.08 (1978).
123. See notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text.
124. By avoiding the congestion of the court system, the average commer-
cial arbitration seldom takes more than 60 days. M. DomKE, THE LAw AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8 (1968).
125. Arbitration is a less expensive process not only because attorney rep-
resentation is discouraged, but also because it is faster than litigation. The use
of volunteer arbitrators further reduces costs. See NATIONAL INSTrrUTE FOR
CONSUMER JUSTICE-STAFF STUDIES ON ARBITRATION 58-59 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF STUDIES]. Finally, the opportunity to choose a convenient time
and place for the arbitration hearing may be financially advantageous to both
parties.
The lower cost of the dispute settlement scheme is demonstrated by the
HOW program, which charges a $25 fee to a party requesting conciliation, a $75
fee to a party requesting arbitration, and a $50 investigative fee to a buyer who
claims major construction defects between the third and tenth years of owner-
ship. If the complainant's request is meritorious, however, the fee is refunded.
See Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program, supra note 7, at 379.
Since most arbitrators have some expertise, they should be able to deter-
mine what constitutes a defect far better than a judge who lacks experience in
the construction field. See STAFF STUDIEs, supra, at 60-61.
Although the absence of publicity tends to favor the builder, the homeown-
er may feel more comfortable in an informal setting. Id. at 62-63.
Informality allows the arbitrator greater latitude in seeking the facts. The
rules of evidence are not applicable and the arbitrator may conduct an in-
dependent investigation. The arbitrator is less bound by "rules of law" and,
therefore, can more easily decide a case on the basis of equity. Id. at 63-64.
Since arbitration can take place anywhere, the homeowner may request
that the hearing take place in his home where the defect can be observed by
the arbitrator. Id. at 65-66.
It would be presumptuous to maintain that arbitration proceedings are in-
herently more "fair" than court proceedings. Any increased fairness would be
simply the product of other advantages; it is more likely that 'Justice" will be
accomplished at an early stage of the dispute-resolution process. Id. at 66-69.
126. The self-policing standards include evaluation on the basis of compli-
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"excessive" number of defective homes, he will be dropped
from the fund and will therefore be unable to build in the
state.127
Although both the New Jersey and HOW plans share the
benefits of informal settlement procedures, the HOW scheme
has additional advantages that are absent from the New Jersey
plan. One example is the HOW plan's economical use of pri-
vate mediators, in contrast to the New Jersey plan's use of
state-supplied conciliators, arbitrators, and other personnel.
Another disadvantage of the New Jersey plan is that it permits
either party to request a formal adversarial hearing.128 The use
of the statutory process is also more expensive, since such a
hearing would probably require the services of an attorney.129
A final benefit of the HOW plan is that it makes the arbitrator's
decision binding on the vendor but not on the vendee.130 Thus,
if a vendee believes that he is being "railroaded" by concilia-
tors or arbitrators who favor builders, he may still resort to ju-
dicial remedies. The more flexible plans, those of HOW and
Minnesota, permit the vendee to pursue common law rights
concurrently with statutory protections.' 3' In New Jersey, how-
ever, vendees and vendors are equally bound by administrative
decisions. 132 This approach is unnecessarily rigid; homeowners
should be able to take advantage of any rights the law provides
them.
The final major drawback of the Minnesota statute is that it
fails to protect homeowners from subsequent insolvency of
ance, financial stability, and record of dealing with complaints. Telephone in-
terview with Gerry Regan, Minnesota HOW representative, in Minneapolis,
Minnesota (Oct. 26, 1978).
127. See note 95 supra.
128. Note, however, that not all the attributes of a trial are necessary at the
hearing. See In re Public Hearings of Commuter Operating Agency 1975-1976,
142 N.J. Super. 136, 361 A.2d 30 (1976). The mere fact that the statutory provi-
sion imposes a duty on the agency to receive and consider evidence in a hear.
ing does not of itself signify that the hearing must resemble a trial. Id. at 151,
361 A.2d at 38. Nevertheless, "an opportunity ... to respond, appear and pres-
ent evidence and argument on all issues involved" must be afforded to all par-
ties. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B:9(c) (West Supp. 1979).
129. Since arbitration is a less formal procedure, the vendee may well be ca-
pable of arguing his case without legal counsel. Due to the concomitant cost
saving, he is more likely to pursue this remedy.
130. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
131. See HOW WAmLA=r AGREEMENT supra note 106, at 4, 6; MINN. STAT.
§ 327A.06 (1978).
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-9 (West Supp. 1979).
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builders. The warranties in all three plans initially run from
the vendor to the vendee; if the vendor is reputable and sol-
vent,133 there will be no difficulty. If, however, the vendor is un-
scrupulous or insolvent, vendees with meritorious claims may
be without effective remedies. 3 4 The HOW plan avoids this
problem by requiring participating builders to insure their per-
formance under the warranty before selling the dwelling. 35
Once that premium is paid, the dwelling is protected regardless
of the solvency or scruples of the builder. The benefits of this
scheme are made even more attractive by the requirement that
builders reregister with HOW every year. Any builder that
compiles an unsatisfactory complaint record is removed from
the program. 3 6 The removal of high-risk vendors maintains the
cost of the insurance program at a reasonable level. The HOW
plan, however, does have a critical weakness: since vendor par-
ticipation is voluntary, significant numbers of homebuyers may
be left without effective protection. 37 The solution to this prob-
lem is some form of statutory compulsory participation. 38
Such a requirement would raise the question whether the state
should mandate private warranty insurance coverage or should
133. Many homebuilders constructed quality homes and offered express
warranties before the era of statutory warranties. Some builders will routinely
repair defects to protect their reputation and maintain good will. For example,
Centex Home Corp. of Dallas, Texas, a national homebuilder, offered the fol-
lowing protections: a thorough inspection on the closing date, a return visit one
year later to rectify defects, periodic service should a defect arise, and a fairly
comprehensive warranty. Interview with Richard Martin, Attorney for Centex
Home Corp. of Dallas, Texas, in St. Paul, Minnesota (Oct. 13, 1978) (Centex
Warranty on fie with the Minnesota Law Review).
In the past, housing construction was predominantly done by small build-
ers in localized markets. National builders, however, are becoming more com-
mon. Many of these national homebuilders are eager to satisfy homeowners
because they anticipate repeat purchasers in a mobile society. Interview with
Richard Martin, supra.
134. A significant problem is that unscrupulous "fly-by-night" builders often
erect superficially attractive houses that are structurally unsound. Homes
sometimes are built by a collapsible corporation which ceases to exist upon
completion of the last home in the project. This scheme is relatively easy to
effect in states that permit incorporation for a limited period; the vendor can
merely set the date of expiration a few days beyond the expected completion
date of the last house. See, e.g., MODEL BusinEss CORPOATION AcT § 54(b)
(1969); MIn. STAT. § 301.04(2) (1978). In addition to unscrupulous builders,
there are other builders who either go bankrupt or simply leave the home con-
struction business.
135. See text accompanying note 106 supra; Note, The Home Oumers War-
ranty Program, supra note 7, at 360 n.18.
136. See Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program, supra note 7, at 377
n.103.
137. See id. at 373-74.
138. But see id. at 373.
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itself enter the warranty insurance business. New Jersey has
chosen to do both. The New Jersey statute mandates that no
builder may engage in the business of constructing new homes
unless he is registered with the State.139 As a precondition to
registration, the builder must submit proof of participation in
the state new home warranty security fund or an approved pri-
vate alternative.140
The administrative costs of privately operated builder in-
surance plans will most likely be lower than those of state
plans.141 The private sector profit motive should encourage
managerial efficiency; governmental regulatory programs, on
the other hand, tend to become cumbersome and inefficient.142
In addition, if similar insurance plans were operated in several
states, a private, multi-state insurer could achieve greater econ-
omies of scale than could a state-sponsored insurer limited to
one state.
The best solution, therefore, is a statutory mandate that
builders obtain state-approved, private warranty insurance as a
requisite to home construction. In this way, all the benefits of
the HOW program are realized without the state immersing it-
self in the actual mechanics of claim settlement. Such a statute
must establish minimum standards for the private programs
and a minimal administrative framework.
IV. THE MODEL STATUTE
Since the current Minnesota new home warranties statute
is inadequate, this Note offers a Model Statute, drafted in the
form of a comprehensive new Minnesota statute.143 The Model
139. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3B-5 (West Supp. 1979).
140. Id.
141. See generally Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program, supra note
7, at 370-74. Indeed, a comparison of the fees charged by HOW and the New
Jersey state plan supports this prediction. HOW charges a fee of 0.2% of the
purchase price, one-half of which is the insurance premium and one-half of
which covers administrative costs of the program. See id. at 362. New Jersey's
estimated costs, by contrast, are 0.5% of the purchase price. See HOW builders
exempt from N.J. law save $$, HOW Builder (Oct. 30, 1978) (newsletter of the
Home Owners Warranty Corporation) (on file with the Minnesota Law Re-
view).
142. See Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program, supra note 7, at 372.
143. The Model Statute follows the structure of the current Minnesota law.
Minor grammatical and technical changes are either made without mention or
briefly noted in footnotes. Significant changes are discussed in a brief textual
analysis following the model Occasionally, a meritorious provision is omitted
despite favorable mention in prior discussion. Such omissions reflect an ap-
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Statute, designed to be acceptable to builders as well as con-
sumers, may also prove useful in states other than Minnesota,
given the similar inadequacies of the other programs and the
general lack of statutory protection of home purchasers.
A. TEXT OF THE MODEL STATUTE
Section I-Definitions
As used in this chapter:
Subdivision 1. "Building standards" means the structural, mechanical,
electrical, and quality standards of both the state and local building
codes, Minnesota Statutes sections 16.83 to 16.867, and of the home
building industry for the geographic area in which the dwelling is situ-
ated.1 44
Subd. 2. "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Administration.
Subd. 3. "Dwelling" means a new building14 5 (including, but not lim-
ited to, apartment buildings, cooperative housing, condominiums,
multi-family units, single family units, and townhouses), 14 6 not previ-
ously occupied and constructed for use as a residence.14 7 "Dwelling"
includes appurtenant recreational facilities, detached garages, drive-
ways, walkways, patios, boundary walls, retaining walls, and all other
similar items associated with a residence, but does not include mobile
homes covered by sections 327.51 to 327.67 of Minnesota Statutes. 1 4 8
Subd. 4. "Dwelling warranty plan" means any warranty or insurance
plan submitted for the Commissioner's approval
14 9
Subd. 5. "Initial vendee" means a person who contracts to purchase a
dwelling for use as a residence 15 0 and not for resale in the ordinary
course of trade.
Subd. 6. "Major construction defect" means actual damage to the load-
bearing portion of the dwelling (including damage due to subsidence,
praisal of the political feasibility of enacting a statute containing such a provi-
sion.
144. See notes 33-38 supra and accompanying text
145. Used dwellings are not protected by the statute. See note 29 supra.
146. Although these examples are already included in the definition "con-
structed for use as a residence," they are inserted to resolve potential ambigu-
ity. The "including, but not limited to," clause emphasizes that the types of
housing are exemplary and not exhaustive. See note 31 supra.
147. Given that the rationale behind the Minnesota statute can be catego-
rized as "residence protection" and that "habitability" means suitability for liv-
ing in, all references to habitation have been altered to conform to the
"residence protection" rationale. See notes 28, 78-81 supra and accompanying
text.
148. These items are included in the Model Statute to promote a reasonable
consumer expectation rationale. See notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text.
If, however, the statute is only intended to protect habitability, the exclusion of
appurtenant facilities would enhance political feasibility. Since mobile homes
are "constructed for use as a residence" they could arguably be included in the
statutory definition. In Minnesota, however, they should be explicitly excluded
since they are regulated elsewhere.
149. "Dwelling warranty plan" is a new concept introduced by the Model
Statute and therefore requires definition.
150. Pursuant to the analysis of note 23 supra, the phrase "from a vendor"
has been deleted in order to prevent sham conveyances.
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expansion, or lateral movement of the soil) which affects its load-bear-
ing function or which vitally affects or is imminently likely to vitally af-
fect use of the dwelling as a residence.1 5 1
Subd. 7. "Vendee" means any purchaser of a dwelling and includes the
initial vendee and subsequent purchasers.
Subd. 8. "Vendor" means any person, firm, or corporation that con-
structs dwellings for the purpose of sale, including dwellings on land
owned by vendees.
Subd. 9. "Required warranty" means the warranty prescribed by the
Commissioner pursuant to section two, subdivision one of this chapter.
Subd. 10. "Warranty date" is the earlier of:
(a) The date of the initial vendee's first occupancy of the dwell-
ing; or
(b) The date when the completed structure was first made avail-
able for occupancy,1 52 if the initial vendee has taken legal or equitable
title in the dwelling.
Section 2-Warranty Provision
Subdivision 1. The Commissioner is hereby authorized and directed to
prescribe by rule or regulation a required warranty. Such warranty
shall, at a minimum, provide that in every sale of a completed dwelling,
and in every contract for the sale of a dwelling to be completed, the
vendor warrants to the vendee that-
(a) During the one-year period from and after the warranty date,
the dwelling shall be free from defects caused by faulty workmanship
or defective materials where the defects result from noncompliance
with building standards; and
(b) During the four-year period from and after the warranty date,
the dwelling shall be free from defects caused by faulty installation of
plumbing, electrical, heating, and cooling systems;1 5 3 and
(c) During the ten-year period from and after the warranty date,
the dwelling shall be free from major construction defects.
Subd. 2. The warranties required or approved under this chapter shall
survive the passing of legal or equitable title in the dwelling.
Subd. 3. The liability of the vendor under this chapter shall not ex-
tend1 5 4 to the following
(a) Loss or damage not reported by the vendee to the vendor in
writing within six months after the vendee discovers or should have
151. The last sentence of Minnesota Statutes section 327A.01(5) states:
'Major construction defect' does not include damage due to movement of the
soil caused by flood, earthquake or other natural disaster." MINN. STAT.
§ 327A.01(5) (1978). It has been deleted since the exclusion is covered in sec-
tion two, subdivision one of the Model Statute.
152. The modification will ensure that the warranty protections correspond
more closely to the date of actual use of the dwelling. See note 25 supra.
153. This period is extended to four years because of judicial extension of
the four-year U.C.C. warranty to home fixtures. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota
Natural Gas, 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977), and cases cited in note 40 supra.
154. The language "shall not extend" denies the Commissioner authority to
alter these exclusions. They may only be altered by statutory amendment.
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discovered the loss or damage;155
(b) Loss or damage where the defective design, installation, or
materials were requested or supervised by the vendee, provided that
the selection or supervision of the vendee is active and not a passive
acquiescence in the judgment of the vendor 156
(c) Secondary loss or damage such as personal injury or property
damage; 157
(d) Loss or damage from normal wear and tear
(e) Loss or damage from dampness or condensation when loss or
damage is due to insufficient ventilation after occupation, except where
the insufficient ventilation is caused by the vendor's failure to comply
with building standards; 158
(f) Loss or damage from the negligence of, improper mainte-
nance by, or alteration of the dwelling by parties other than the vendor;
(g) Loss or damage from changes in grading of the ground around
the dwelling by parties other than the vendor;
(h) Loss or damage to the landscaping 159
(i) Loss or damage due to failure to maintain the dwelling in
good repair;
(j) Loss or damage due to a vendee's unreasonable failure to min-
imize;16
0
(k) Loss or damage which occurs after the dwelling is no longer
used as a residence;
1 6 1
(1) Accidental loss or damage usually described as resulting from
acts of God (including, but not limited to, fire, explosion, smoke, water
escape, windstorm, hail, lightning, or earthquake), except when the
loss or damage is caused by failure to comply with building standards;
(m) Loss or damage from soil movement which is compensated
by legislation;
1 62
Section 3-Powers of the Commissioner; Approval of Dwelling Warranty
Plans
Subdivision 1. The Commissioner may, pursuant to Minnesota Stat-
utes sections 15.0411 to 15.052,163 promulgate additional warranty pro-
tections to supplement those mandated by section two, subdivision one
155. See note 55 supra.
156. See note 50 supra.
157. This concession appears necessary to ensure the political feasibility of
the statute. The original version of the Minnesota bill for statutory warranties
on new housing, which included personal injury liability, was unsuccessful at
the committee stage. Sieben Interview, supra note 76. If the statute is in-
tended to protect consumer expectations, however, there should be no such ex-
clusion.
158. See note 52 supra.
159. Cf note 59 supra (suggesting that the landscaping exception could be
omitted if appurtenant facilities are excluded from the definition of dwelling).
160. A reasonable person test is preferable to an undefined "feasibility"
standard. See note 56 supra.
161. See note 28 supra.
162. See note 58 supra.
163. Ideally, the Commissioner should be allowed to promulgate these addi-
tional warranty protections pursuant to an informal "notice and comment" pro-
cedure. In Minnesota, however, the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act
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of this chapter. The Commissioner shall not extend warranty protec-
tion to loss or damage excluded by section two, subdivision three of
this chapter.
Subd. 2. The Commissioner, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
16.85, may amend the state building code.
Subd. 3. The Commissioner is hereby authorized to review and ap-
prove proposed dwelling warranty plans after a hearing pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 15.0418.164 The Commissioner shall ap-
prove any proposed dwelling warranty plan that satisfies the following
criteria:
1 6 5
(a) The proposed dwelling warranty plan shall provide warranty
protections that meet or exceed the protections specified in section two
of this chapter as supplemented by any additional warranty protec-
tions promulgated by the Commissioner pursuant to section three, sub-
division one of this chapter.
(b) The proposed dwelling warranty plan shall provide an infor-
mal complaint procedure and a procedure for conciliation and arbitra-
tion of disputes, and shall provide that arbitration decisions are
binding only upon the vendor and the insurer under the dwelling war-
ranty plan. In addition, the vendee shall have a cause of action against
the vendor or the insurer under the dwelling warranty plan for dam-
ages arising out of the breach, or, if damages are inadequate, for spe-
cific performance. Damages are limited to (a) the amount necessary to
remedy the defect or breach; or (b) the difference between the value of
the dwelling with the defect and the value of the dwelling without the
defect.
(c) The proposed dwelling warranty plan shall provide for the
creation of a fund sufficient to pay claims reasonably to be anticipated
under the plan.
Subd. 4. The Commissioner shall, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 15.0412, revoke or suspend, at any time, the approval of a dwell-
ing warranty plan, if he finds that the plan no longer satisfies the crite-
ria stated in section three, subdivision three of this chapter.
Subd. 5. The Commissioner shall, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 15.0412, promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary
to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
Section 4-Regulation of Vendors
Subdivision 1. All vendors must register with the Commissioner before
engaging in the business of new home construction. As a precondition
to registration, the vendor must offer proof of participation in an ap-
proved dwelling warranty plan.
Subd. 2. Any vendor who fails to register, or who contracts to sell or
does not bifurcate types of administrative hearings, and the Commissioner
must work with the more burdensome procedure. See note 116 supra.
164. In this situation, a formal adjudicatory proceeding is more appropriate
due to the serious implications of rejecting a proposed plan. See note 116 supra
for the attributes of two forms of rulemaking. See also Auerbach, supra note
116, at 151.
165. The problem of the reticent Commissioner is avoided by making the
language mandatory rather than permissive. See note 77 supra.
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sells a dwelling not covered by a dwelling warranty plan, shall be sub-
ject to a fine not to exceed $2,000 for each offense. The Commissioner
shall enforce this section in accordance with Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 574.35.
Section 5-Waiver and Variations
Subdivision 1. Except as provided in subdivision two of this section,
the provisions of this chapter cannot be waived or modified by contract
or otherwise and any agreement which purports to do so shall be void.
Subd. 2. If a major construction defect is discovered prior to the sale
of a dwelling, the warranty requirements of section two of this chapter
may be waived, after full oral disclosure of the specific defect, by an in-
strument that sets forth in detail: the specific defect; the difference be-
tween the value of the dwelling without the defect and the value of the
dwelling with the defect (as determined and attested to by an in-
dependent appraiser, contractor, insurance adjuster, engineer, or any
other similarly knowledgeable person selected by the vendee); the
price reduction; the date construction was completed; the legal descrip-
tion of the dwelling; the consent of the vendee to the waiver; and the
signatures of the vendee, the vendor, and two witnesses. Waivers
under this subdivision shall not be effective unless filed for recording
with the county recorder or registrar of titles, who shall file the waiver
for record.16 6
Section 6-Remedies
The initiation of procedures to enforce a remedy shall not constitute an
election of remedies so as to bar the vendee from any other remedy.
Section 7-Other Warranties
Subdivision 1. The warranties provided in this chapter shall be in ad-
dition to all other warranties imposed by law or agreement.
Subd. 2. The remedies provided for in this chapter shall not be con-
strued as limiting any other remedies.
Subd. 3. Section 541.051 shall not apply to actions based on breach of
the warranties provided for in this chapter.
B. EXPLANATION OF THE MODEL STATUTE
Section one of the Model Statute, although similar to the
current Minnesota statute, significantly expands the meanings
of several terms used in both statutes. First, "building stan-
dard" has been altered to expressly incorporate the state build-
ing codes and the "standard procedures" of similar builders in
the industry. Although the modification would merely codify
the meaning that can be inferred from the Minnesota statute, it
166. The waiver provision of Minnesota Statutes section 327A.04, subdivi-
sion two, is not applicable to the Model Statute. Since all vendors must obtain
state-approved dwelling warranty plans, the need for modification at the con-
tract level is moot. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text. However, the
need for the waiver of the inadvertent major construction defect is not so obvi-
ated. See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
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would ensure that the standard could not be weakened. In sim-
ilar fashion, the definition of the types of "dwellings" included
in the statute's protection would, for the most part, simply cod-
ify the definition implied in the current statute. A significant
expansion in the meaning of "dwelling" under the model stat-
ute, however, is the inclusion of appurtenant facilities within
the statutory warranties. The expansion beyond the current
"residence protection" rationale 167 would ensure that a home-
owner's recovery will not depend on the placement of the ga-
rage, and that the builder will not have an incentive to
construct shoddy appurtenant facilities.
A major change in the Model Statute is the expansion, in
section two, of the term "warranty"; new home warranties
would no longer be exclusively defined in the statute. Under
section three, the Commissioner would have the power, after a
hearing, to expand the scope of warranty protections as well as
the power to approve new home warranty plans. The Commis-
sioner could not, however, limit the minimum protections of
section two, subdivision one, which parallel the warranties in
the current Minnesota statute. These essential protections in-
clude a one-year period covering defects caused by faulty work-
manship or defective materials, both of which must result from
noncompliance with the building standards. The duration of
the warranty covering faulty installation of plumbing, electrical,
heating, and cooling systems would be extended under the
Model Statute from two to four years in order to conform to the
Uniform Commercial Code.168 The ten-year period of coverage
for major construction defects is unchanged. In order to ensure
fair and equitable treatment to builders under the statute, the
maximum extent of the Commissioner's authority is estab-
lished by the exclusions in section two, subdivision three. In
addition, all proposed dwelling warranty plans must be ap-
proved if they meet the standards set forth in section three,
subdivision three.
One of the required elements of proposed dwelling war-
ranty plans under the Model Statute is an informal conciliation
and arbitration procedure, the outcome of which is binding on
the vendor and the insurer under the warranty plan, but not on
the vendee. The availability of informal proceedings will
167. See notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text.
168. See note 40 supra.
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strengthen the protections of the statute by providing a low-
cost method of enforcement. The procedure is binding on the
vendor to secure his participation. By extending liability to the
dwelling warranty plan, the statute protects the homeowner re-
gardless of the builder's financial status. The arbitration deci-
sion is not made binding on the vendee because the statute is
intended as a supplement to his other remedies.
To ensure continued compliance with the statutory re-
quirements, section three, subdivision four, of the Model Stat-
ute gives the Commissioner the authority to suspend the
approval of any dwelling warranty plan if he finds that the plan
no longer satisfies the criteria set forth in section three, subdi-
vision three. Once a plan has been revoked, the builders who
are members of that plan will be unable to build because,
under section four, all vendors, prior to construction of dwell-
ings, must register with the Commissioner and offer proof of
participation in an approved dwelling warranty plan. The
dwelling warranty plans ensure protection even to victims of
"fly-by-night" builders. The incentive for builders to register
and comply with the statute is increased by the threat of being
dropped from a warranty plan. If dropped from a plan, a
builder must decide whether to pay "high risk" premiums or to
refrain from building. The long-term result is that less reputa-
ble builders are removed from the housing market, while at all
times dwellings built by them are accorded full warranty pro-
tections.
Section five provides for only one method of waiving the
warranty protections of the Model Statute. A waiver is allowed
in the unusual case in which a major construction defect is dis-
covered prior to the sale of the dwelling and extensive procedu-
ral safeguards are followed. Sections six and seven reinforce
the notion that the chapter is supplemental to, and not in dero-
gation of preexisting warranties and remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago, courts began to recognize implied war-
ranties on new homes. The focus of that movement has re-
cently shifted to several state legislatures that have taken the
initiative in providing adequate protection to new home pur-
chasers. Minnesota has recently joined that movement by the
enactment of a new home warranties statute. Although that
statute provides significant coverage, analysis of the Minnesota
statute in light of the New Jersey new home warranties statute
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and the National Association of Home Builders' Home Owners
Warranty program suggests areas that need improvement. The
optimal plan involves a combination of state regulation and pri-
vate industry initiative. On the one hand, the state should set
minimal requirements and outside liability limits on the private
plans, guarantee that the private plans are adequate, and en-
sure builder participation in the plans. On the other hand, pri-
vate industry should provide the operational aspect of the
warranty plan. If this plan were followed, the result would be a
union of private and public sectors that would create an effi-
cient, practical, and effective new home warranty, fair to the
homeowner, yet fair to the homebuilder. State legislatures
should recognize the advantages of legislation such as pro-
posed in this Note, and act to confer its benefits on the pur-
chasers of new homes in their states.

